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Introduction
A country's electoral system is a key determinant of many of its political outcomes. How politicians are elected has been shown to matter for the degree of female representation (Duverger, 1955; Norris, 1985; Matland and Studlar, 1996) , the level of redistribution (Iversen and Soskice, 2006; Persson et al., 2007) , the level of corruption (Persson et al., 2003) , party dynamics (Duverger, 1951; Kedar et al., 2016) , pubic spending (Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2002; Lizzeri and Persico, 2001 ) and a wide range of policy outcomes (Morelli, 2004) .
1
Given the impact that this choice has on policy outcomes and hence welfare, it is this critical to understand how countries end up with different electoral systems out of a wide range of possible alternatives. The existing literature on this topic has mainly focused on politicians' preferences, likely because they are the most visible actors in the process of choosing an electoral system. So far, a key actor who has been generally overlooked is the electorate. This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature. One of the reasons why citizens' preferences have likely been overlooked is the relative scarcity of past electoral system changes that included mechanisms for popular participation. Between 1961 and 2011, there were only twenty-four relatively serious attempts to change electoral systems in OECD democracies with only nine changes being made (Bol, 2016) . In this paper, we focus on one of these serious attempts which also happened to be a successful one. Specifically, in 1993, New Zealanders faced a binary choice between keeping a long established First Past
The Post (FPTP henceforth) system or changing to a pure proportional system known as Mixed Member Proportional (MMP). This binding referendum was held alongside a general election (still under FPTP rule) and hence had very high turnout (85 percent of the eligible electorate voted). In the end, 54 percent of voters chose MMP and the electoral system was changed starting with the next general election in 1996.
Our main analysis uses data from all 4,273 polling stations in New Zealand which we geocoded and merged with Census data on the socioeconomic characteristics of voters at each station to examine the relationship between voting outcomes and voter characteristics. Because the general election was held at the same time as the referendum, for each station, we know both which parties individuals voted for and the proportion who voted to change to MMP. This allows us to examine the role of partisanship as well as socioeconomic characteristics in determining citizens' preferences for an electoral system. The average station has only 450 voters, hence our analysis is undertaken at a very low level of aggregation and we are able to control for a wide range of location specific characteristics.
We also perform two additional analyzes to support out main findings. First, a small subset of 150 urban polling stations had polling booths for two or even three nearby electoral districts. In these cases, the socioeconomic characteristics of the electorate in each district should be nearly the same, but for historical reasons, often the preferred party in these neighboring districts differs. This allows us to estimate polling station fixed effects models which allow us to examine the relationship between past party voting patterns and referendum voting controlling for all unobservable socioeconomic characteristics. Second, we use survey data from the 1993 New Zealand Election Study (NZES) to examine the relationship between self-reported referendum voting, socioeconomic characteristics and self-reported party voting and party support. This data allows us to examine individual level relationships and to control for a wider range of individual preferences and opinions.
However, unlike in our main analysis, here the key variables are self-reported and could potentially suffer from justification bias.
We find robust evidence that partisan preferences drove voters' choices; people supported the system that was thought to benefit their preferred party the most. This is the case when examining the full cross-section of polling stations, when examining only polling stations where people could vote in more than one electorate and controlling in addition for station fixed effects, and when using the NZES to examine individual voting behavior. Here, our results are robust to controlling for socioeconomic characteristics, where people place themselves on a left-right ideological scale and their support for different political parties; even with these controls, for which party an individual voted for in the previous election strongly determines how they voted in the referendum.
However, instrumental, partisan preferences do not fully explain electoral system choice. Socioeconomic characteristics and social values also matter; people who hold more progressive values, are more educated, are outside the dominant religion, are male, and live in urban areas were much more likely to support changing to a proportional system. Survey data show that these findings hold at the individual level and further that individuals who were angry with the economy were much more likely to vote against the status quo, regardless of their background, party preferences or social values. Importantly, these preferences cannot result from a distaste for malapportinment or gerrymandering, which are both non-existent in New Zealand. It is most likely that these patterns reveal an intrinsic preference for particular democratic processes. Supporting this, we also find that individuals who put intrinsic value on characteristics usually associated with proportional systems, such as coalition governments and a fair mapping from votes to seats, are also much more likely to support MMP.
The main contribution of our paper is that, to the best of our knowledge, it is the first to use field data from a binding referendum to examine individual determinants of electoral system choice. The referendum we examine is particularly relevant for understanding individual preferences because: (i) all adult residents of New Zealand were eligible to vote; (ii) the issue of electoral system reform was salient, in particular because there had been a non-binding referendum in the previous year; and (iii) individuals were deciding on whether to change a system that had been in place for over a century (140 years to be precise). The few studies that have previously examined individual preferences for electoral systems have mainly relied on hypothetical choices made in surveys and experiments by participants in contexts where an electoral reform was not on the agenda (Blais et al., 2015; Aldrich et al., 2014; Wenzel et al., 2000) . Despite the strengths of these papers, they all have in common that the set of respondents was answering questions regarding a relatively abstract and unlikely event.
2 Lack of saliency has been shown to be a problem in survey-based studies, since it results in satisficing and socially desirable answers Krosnick (1999) .
In general, our results are consistent with this previous literature which also finds that voters are usually self-interested in hypothetical situations (Aldrich et al., 2014; Wenzel et al., 2000) 3 . In this light, our results confirm that hypothetical choice experiments are a reasonable way to collect information about individual's preferences for different electoral system and that saliency does not appear to change the underlying importance of partisanship in determining people's choices. However, we are first paper to show that social values are also important determinant individual's preferences for electoral systems, and in particular, that voter anger was an important determinant of the referendum outcome.
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This type of sentiment is obviously difficult to capture in hypothetical situations and, as 2 The only exceptions we know of are (Aimer and Miller, 2002) which also examines the New Zealand referendum but using just the NZES in a descriptive manner and (Fournier et al., 2011) which examines a sample of citizens who chose to be part of a long-term deliberative process (one year, 20+ meetings), which has obvious self-selection issues.
3 (Fournier et al., 2011) is an exception but relied on self-selected participants who were all member of local assemblies in the Netherlands, Ontario and British Columbia 4 Voter anger was particular relevant at the time of this referendum because in the late 1980s New Zealand underwent a massive free-market de-regularization where campaign promises had been repeatedly broken by both major parties (Roper and Leitch, 1995) the evidence from the Brexit referendum and last US Presidential election suggest, in pre-election polling. Taken together, the results in this paper suggest that governments should not hold referendums in times of a crisis, or, more generally, of wide economic or political alienation, if they want the results to reflect the true underlying preferences of individuals.
2 New Zealand context 2.1 Events leading to the referendum: 1978 -1993 New Zealand was throughout most of the 19th century "a perfect example of the Westminster model of democracy" (Lijphart, 1984) . Government was (and still is) elected by the Parliament, which is the only legislative chamber in the country. Up to and including the 1993 election, all MPs were selected from Single Member Plurality (SMP) districts.
Due to an electoral law that strictly bound the electoral commission against malappor- Despite a Labour victory in 1987, the referendum was never set. Given the rising concerns about fairness and representation among large sectors of the population, the National party, in an attempt to shame Labour, promised a binding referendum in case they won the 1990 elections, to which Labour followed suit. Party elites mostly opposed the referendum, yet realized it was politically perilous to do so publicly (Vowles, 2008 Table 1 ). The new electoral law established MMP for the 1996 general election and required it to be used for at least two consecutive elections before any serious evaluation could be made. 7 Overall, the process that culminated in this referendum has been described as "driven by chance" (Benoit, 2007) , "serendipity" (Nagel, 2004) , or even "accidental" (Vowles, 2008 
Other relevant aspects of the New Zealand electoral system
One peculiarity of the New Zealand system is the existence of a parallel electoral system for native New Zealanders, Māori. These special electorates were introduced in 1867 under the Māori Representation Act. As a consequence, every area in New Zealand is covered by both a General and a Māori electorate. By law, Māori citizens (around one sixth of the total population) can choose whether to register in a General district, or in a district in which only Māori can enroll (and vote). All non-Māori citizens must enroll in the General roll. From 1896 to 1993, the number of Māori seats was fixed at four.
Changing to MMP had a particularly large impact for Māori. It was decided that if MMP was implemented the number of Māori seats would no longer be fixed at four.
Instead, they would now depend upon the number of Māori registered in the Māori Roll (following the same population rules as the electorates in the General Roll). Importantly,
Unless there is an 'overhang', a situation in which the number of MPs may increase in very small numbers. Overhang situations arise when a party wins more districts than the number of MPs designated via the party vote.
9 Parties are required to get greater than five percent of the overall party vote or win an electoral seat to get their full allocation of seats in parliament.
10 As an example, suppose that a party wins 35% of the party votes and wins in 20 of the 71 electorates with the 'electorate vote'. Given that 35% of 120 is 42, this party gains 42 MPs. The first 20 MPs are those who have won the local race via the electorate vote. The other 22 are the first 22 members of the nationwide party list. On the other hand, if a party wins more electorates than the MPs allocated with its share of the party vote, then a situation of an overhang arises. For example, if a party wins 6% of the party votes (which translates into 7 MPs) and 9 electorates, then the number of total MPs rises to 122, and the party gets to keep all its 9 locally elected MPs.
this would mean that the number of Māori-only districts could dramatically increase in the long run if more Māori chose to register in the Māori Roll ("Electoral Act, 1993").
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Currently, there are seven Māori seats.
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Important for the interpretation of some of our findings, New Zealand has strong rules against malapportionment. Specifically, the Electoral Amendment Law of 1945 states that the registered population in any given district could not be more or less than 500 people of the established quota, which was later modified in 1950 to deviate by at most ± 7.5% and in 1956 by at most ± 5%, where it has stayed ever since.
13 Hence, redistricting is an uncommon phenomena driven entirely by population change. Generally speaking because of the fixed number of Māori seats, Māori are the only group in New Zealand who 'lost out' under FPTP because of the how the electoral map was drawn.
Another important detail relevant for our empirical strategy is that while voters in New Zealand can vote in any polling station within their electorate, historically nearly all have chosen to cast their votes on election day at the closest polling station. 14 While it is possible to vote in another electorate on election day if an individual is traveling, this requires a 'special' vote and is relatively costly in terms of paperwork. Hence, the sociodemographic characteristics of individuals living in the area near a polling station can be thought of a very accurate representation of the preferences of the voters at that station.
3 Data and empirical strategy
Data
Our main analysis relies on data that we combined from two different datasets that cover the whole country: (i) election and referendum results at the polling station level and
(ii) the general Census. We drop all "special vote polling stations" which includes hospital votes, ordinary votes and special votes before polling day, special votes on polling day and overseas votes.
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We do so because we do not have information on the sociodemographic characteristics of these voters which is critical to our empirical strategy. Give the potential bias in preferences among Māori driven by the "Electoral Act (1993)" (see Section 2.3 above),
we also exclude polling stations from the Māori Roll. Our analysis sample hence includes data from 1, 637, 117 voters at 3,244 polling stations, which covers 85.4% of the total number of votes cast in the election. Table 2 shows basic information on these polling stations for the full sample and our analysis sample. There no apparent bias in terms of party or electoral system preferences in our restricted analysis sample of polling stations.
In the Supplementary Materials, we show that all our results hold when we include polling stations in Māori districts.
Finally, in Section 4.3, we use survey data from the 1993 New Zealand Election Study (NZES). This was a post-election survey that was administered through a self-completion questionnaire. 2,251 individuals responded (around 70% of the initially targeted). This survey included questions on referendum choice and party choice for the elections, as well as the usual battery of questions on sociodemographics, party preferences, political attitudes, social values, etc. As discussed above, we use the NZES to test whether our 15 We are able to geolocate all but seven polling stations which we exclude from our analysis. 16 The few area units that have three or more polling stations are generally large ones in rural areas. In the Supplementary Materials we show that when we cluster standard errors at the area unit level all results hold.
17 This dataset is not publicly available and was obtained directly from the Electoral Commission. It contains data from 1998. Since the changes in roll composition were minor from 1993 to 1998, we take this as an adequate proxy for the 1993 roll composition.
18 A special vote is a vote made by an elector who is unable to visit a polling place in their own electorate on election day, or is not on the electoral roll on election day. main results hold up when examining individual voting behavior and to examine the importance of additional characteristics that can only be captured in a survey for voting decisions.
Empirical strategy
Our main unit of observation is the polling station matched to the sociodemographic characteristics of voters in the Area Unit in which the station is located. Our main regression specification is as follows:
where %MMP i is the percentage of votes for MMP in polling station i ; X ia is a vector of sociodemographic characteristics of Area Unit a in which polling station i is located;
and %P i is the share of votes for party P in polling station i. 19 We include the vote share in a quadratic form because, as will be shown below, there appears to be a nonlinear relationship between vote shares and voting for MMP. Because there are multiple polling stations in the same electorate, we cluster all standard errors at this level. We weigh all results by number of votes at the polling station, so that our results indicate the relationship for the average voter as opposed to the average polling station. Figure 2 shows the distribution of results at the electorate and polling station levels.
Results

Main results
There was a wide distribution of voting in the referendum; in some polling stations less than 20% of people supported changing to MMP while in others over 80% of voters supported change. Table 3 reports the OLS results of regressing the share of votes for MMP on sociodemographic characteristics (i.e., expression (1) above without party shares).
Some patterns stand out: urban areas and areas with higher proportion of residents born abroad strongly supported MMP; similarly, the higher educated and those who were more dependent on the state subsidies for income were more supportive of MMP. Māori and 19 Appendix Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the sociodemographic characteristics we include in the regression.
women seemed also more supportive of MMP, although these results are not robust to all specifications. Finally, the relationship between income and referendum choice is unclear:
whereas relatively richer areas (as measured by median income) were less likely to support MMP, areas with greater proportion of people with annual income below $20,000 were less supportive of MMP.
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Next, we examine the correlation between partisan support and electoral system choice. Figure 3 Table 4 reports the OLS results of regressing the share of votes for MMP on sociodemographic characteristics and party shares (i.e., expression (1) above).
21 All patterns just discussed hold: controlling for all sorts of socioeconomic characteristics, National supporters prefer FPTP, Labour strongholds seem to moderately support FPTP, and supporters of Alliance strongly prefer MMP. Figure 5 shows the magnitude of these effects by plotting predicted support for MMP from results in (6) in Table 4 . The non-linearities become more apparent: MMP wins by a small margin in polling stations where National and Labour have equal support. However, whereas deviations in favor of Labour barely increase predicted support for MMP, as we increase the share of National, support for MMP rapidly decreases. When it comes to Alliance, the pattern of predicted support is unambiguously increasing in vote shares for the party.
Matched Polling Stations
There are 150 mainly urban polling stations that have polling booths for two or even three electoral districts. As discussed above, we focus on these stations only for one of our robustness tests. Here we illustrate our approaching with examples from three of these stations, (Forrest Hill Church Hall, K.C.E.P.B. Depot, and King George Hall), whereas Figure 6 shows one in a map. The three examples shown reveal that differences in results across ballot boxes within the same polling station can be striking. We use this to set a pairwise matching strategy.
Given that the vast majority of citizens vote in the closest polling station, all voters in any such polling station i can be safely assumed to share the same socioeconomic characteristics, regardless of the electoral district booth they effectively cast their vote in.
Hence, differences in partisan support and electoral system choice across voting booths in the same polling station must be driven by unobservables at the electorate level, like MP quality or pork barreling. Since we have general election results for 1990 at the electorate level, we use them as a proxy for such unobservables.
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To be precise, our identification strategy works as follows: let MMP 93 ig be the share of votes for MMP in polling station i, electorate g. Also define the difference in party support in 1990 between National and Labour in electorate g as ∆ 90 g (we cannot use any results for Alliance, since it did not run prior to the 1993 election). We run the following regression:
Since we assume that those who vote in polling station i electoral district g and those 22 Ideally, one would use as a proxy the 1990 results at the polling station level, but these are not available. 
Results using survey data
To further check for the robustness of results displayed thus far, we use data from the 1993 New Zealand Election Study. The original data set consists of 2,251 post-election respondents. Due to missing data issues, we can only use 1,296 subjects for our analysis.
Table VII in the Supplementary materials shows the descriptive statistics: there seems to be no observable patterns for missing data. The survey contains the usual battery of questions on socioeconomic background and political attitudes. The following is our main regression specification:
where i refers to an individual respondent, X i is a vector of individual socioeconomic characteristics, and POL i is a vector of political preferences, attitudes, and values. All results throughout are clustered at the electorate level. We include only those respondents who voted in the referendum. Results also reveal that respondents who claimed to be 'often' or 'always' angry with the economy were more likely to support MMP. In particular, column (5) shows that being angry with the economy was a key driver of support for MMP among voters to the right of the political spectrum. Finally, perhaps unsurprisingly, people who support the basic tenants of MMP, such as coalition governments and a fair mapping from votes to seats, were in addition much more likely to support MMP.
Preference intensity
Lastly, we can check whether and how intensity of preferences mattered. Voting was not compulsory in either of the contests. Turnout for the general election was slightly higher than for the referendum; 1,922,796 votes were cast for the general election which was 4,963 more votes than for the referendum. Figure 7 shows the distribution of votes cast at each contest at the polling station level. Only 30% of polling stations had the exact same number of votes in both contests. We use this variability to infer what drove preferences for one contest over the other one.
To that avail, we estimate the following regression specification:
where the dependent variable captures the differential turnout between both elections at polling station i; 24 X ia is a vector of sociodemographic characteristics of the Area Unit a in which polling station i is located; and %P i is the share of votes for party P in polling station i. In the analysis, we cluster all standard errors at the electoral district level. Table 7 shows the results. A few patterns emerge: (i) the highly educated, those born in New Zealand, and those in rural areas were more likely to vote in the referendum; and (ii) supporters of National and Alliance seemed more eager to participate in the referendum. This is consistent with an argument that suggested that voters choose the system that most benefited their favorite party: since both Alliance and National had more at stake than Labour, their supporters were more likely to participate in the referendum. Since the Second World War, Labour and National had typically gathered 80% of the popular vote and virtually all seats in all elections: National had secured government in if not all, smaller parties were left-leaning. In the eyes of many National supporters, this meant that, should voting patterns stay the same after the referendum, the introduction of a proportional system would probably result in Labour and smaller leftist parties easily gaining the majority of parliamentary seats in every election. This is likely to have led a pro-status quo vote among most instrumental National supporters.
The rational approach in the partisan dimension of the average voter is confirmed by behavior at the intensive margin, too. Our analysis on turnout point out that Alliance and National voters were more likely to vote in the referendum than Labour voters (or, framed differently, Labour supporters were more likely to abstain in the referendum).
This is consistent with the fact that both parties were the ones which had, according to their own elites, more to lose should the undesired system win. Larger participation in rural areas, combined with an unambiguous preference for FPTP, may further reflect a stronger desire to keep a system where direct accountability to local electors was key.
Nonetheless, our results further show that a model of electoral system choice purely based on partisan preferences would clearly be flawed. There are many other factors that drove people's choices over and above party allegiances. Three socioeconomic characteristics are strongly correlated with support for a pure proportional system in all specifications; residing in urban areas, having higher levels of formal education, and placing oneself to the left of the political spectrum. Results on formal education are remarkable; once controlling for party preferences, vote at the general election, and all sorts of social values and political attitudes, having any degree higher than a primary school degree increases the probability of supporting a pure proportional system by around 10-15%. This suggests that those with higher levels of formal education place some intrinsic value in a proportional system beyond the instrumental partisan value they may see in it. Given the lack of malapportionment, support of urban citizens for MMP cannot have derived from an urge to increase the weight of their own individual votes, hence support of 'urbanites'
and 'leftists' for MMP seems more likely to derive from the tendency of these subsets of the population to antagonize National.
We also find religion to be a driver of electoral preferences. Followers of the main religion in New Zealand (Protestantism) were much more supportive of maintaining FPTP than their Catholic or agnostic counterparts. As far as we know, there is nothing intrinsic in the Protestant set of beliefs that would favor a majoritarian system. We believe the rationale to be similar to that in Braun (2016) , who finds that, during the Second World War, Jews were more likely to be helped by Protestants in areas in which Protestants were a minority, and more likely to be helped by Catholics where Catholics were a minority.
That is, nothing intrinsic in each religion drove protection, but a sense of local historical grievance and the resultant strength of the networks built therein. In New Zealand, as part of the majoritarian religious group, Protestants may have seen little need to alter the status quo.
Results for income are mixed when using field data. On the one hand, median income in the area unit is positively correlated with supporting FPTP. However, on the other, larger proportions of lower-income are also correlated with more support for FPTP, whereas larger proportions of people earning rents and dividends is associated with stronger support for MMP. Survey data does not shed any further light on the issue.
Regarding age, older people seemed to have preferred a conservative choice (FPTP). Both field and survey results point in the same direction, although these results are not robust to all specifications.
Gender results are also mixed, but overall point in the direction that women were on average more supportive of the status quo than men: survey results show that women were 5-10% more likely to support FPTP than men. We find the differential effect to be specially pronounced among conservative voters. Pino (2017) uses Chilean elections data and finds that women vote in a more conservative manner than men. We also find that Māori overwhelmingly supported MMP. We believe the answer for this lies on the fact that, as discussed above, an increase to the number of Māori seats was linked to a switch in electoral regime. This gave an incentive to Māori who wanted to increase the number of Māori-only districts, beyond any particular considerations on electoral system per se.
Finally, we find that values and attitudes have an impact on electoral preferences over and above party preferences and socioeconomic characteristics. We use respondents attitudes towards immigration, the death penalty and homosexuals to measure values. We find that being more progressive made respondents more likely to support a proportional system. The effects are not trivial; someone who strongly supports progressive values was around 25 percentage points more likely to support MMP than someone who strongly supports conservative values.
There are two reasons why less conservative individuals could be more supportive of a proportional system: (a) by principle, should they believe that a proportional system is intrinsically more valuable than a majoritarian one; or (b) instrumental, should they believe it is more conducive to bringing about progressive political outcomes. Unfortunately, given our data, we cannot disentangle the actual effect of each of these rationales.
We suggest future research to bring insights on this issue.
There is one final remarkable result: respondents who are 'often' or 'always' angry with the economy (34% of the total) are more likely to support MMP. This result holds in particular for strong supporters of National: within this group, respondents who were angry with the economy most of the time were seven percentage points more likely to support MMP. This result has strong implications for referenda in general. The context in New Zealand in the late 80s was of great disengagement with politics and politicians.
This was a result of a sudden and strong bulk of free market and liberalization measures that were started out by a Labour government breaking its campaign promises and continued by the National government (Roper and Leitch, 1995) . Therefore, it is most likely that 'angry' respondents did not support MMP because of its intrinsic characteristics or because of its potential for long term particular policy outcomes. On the contrary, they may have supported MMP because it entailed change, and, furthermore, it was a vote against the "out of touch" (Vowles, 2008) elites of both National and Labour. This has remarkable similarities with recent elections like the Brexit referendum (2016) or the US and Philippines presidential elections of 2016, where it is believed that many voters cast uninformed votes and based their choices on anti-establishment sentiments and a sense of economic disenfranchisement (Hobolt, 2016; Leonard, 2017) .
Concluding remarks
This paper uses a novel strategy in order to ascertain what drives voters' preferences for electoral systems. It is the first one to use results from a binding referendum to that avail (New Zealand, 1993) . We find that voters preferences are mostly driven by partisan selfinterest: they support the system that most benefits their favorite party. However, this paper further shows that a purely partisan instrumental model does not suffice to explain voters choices: preferences towards particular democratic processes are also a key factor.
In other words, voters place an intrinsic value to processes and mechanisms implied by the different electoral systems, beyond the particular policy outcomes that they may deliver.
In particular, we find that people with more progressive values overwhelmingly favor a proportional rule.
Notably, we find that, regardless of socioeconomic status or party allegiances, people who were upset with the economic situation were more likely to vote against the status quo. At the margin, the size of the effect was not negligible in New Zealand: in a close race as the 1993 referendum, those who seemingly used the referendum to send a signal to party elites may have critically secured a victory for the new proportional system. This has notable implications for referenda overall: electors may be tempted to use them to send a signal to politicians, regardless of what the particular issue the referendum may be addressing. Hence, results in this paper would suggest not to hold a referendum in times of a crisis, or, more generally, of wide economic or political upset.
Also, this paper uncovers another dimension of the rural-urban duality: the former prefer majoritarian system, whereas the latter prefer a proportional one. Results suggest that this duality is not driven by a preference or distaste for malapportionment. Further research should serve to confirm if there is a preference for accountability in distant from political power rural areas, and a preference for representativity in urban areas.
Other issues also merit further inquiry: we find that religion is strongly correlated with electoral system preferences. We conjecture that this reveals a preference for status quo among religious groups which are majoritarian and relatively well-off in economic terms.
Finally, we find that women are much more supportive of FPTP than men. Whereas similar gender biases have been previously found in the literature, we cannot provide any framework that accounts for such a difference. We hope that further research will shed more light on the issues that have been left partially answered here.
8 Tables Dependent variable: Percentage of votes for MMP at the Polling Station. All variables refer to Area Unit level data. Population density: (People per km 2 )/1, 000. Party controls: share of votes for Labour, for National, and for Alliance (i.e., column (4) here is equivalent to column (4) in Table 4 ). Standard errors clustered at the electoral district level. Regressions are weighted, where weights given by number of votes at the polling station: '#referendum votes at the polling station/# total referendum votes'. (b) Conditional on the share of votes for Alliance at the polling station, fixing the shares of National and Labour to be the same. Note: the maximum share for Alliance at any polling station is 72%.
Predicted shares for MMP taken from regression (6) in Table 4 (95% confidence intervals plotted). See expression (1) for the regression specification. Example of a polling station that has ballot boxes for more than one electorates: Rangitoto College Hall, which has ballot boxes for both 'Albany' and 'East Coast Bays' electorates. The area in red represents the Area Unit to which the poling station belongs (Area Unit # 507,300). 
